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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
time the title continues in the plaintiff, is a longer step
than we are willing to take."
The court cites and quotes from Garst v. Hall and Lyon
Co., a Massachusetts case similar in facts, 8 "the plaintiff's
right was founded on personal contract alone, and can be
enforced only against the contracting party. To say that
the contract is attached to the property and follows it
through successive sales which severally pass the title, is
a very different proposition."3' 9
According to Professor Chafee' 0 although numerous
eminent authorities and courts have held that such restrictions on chattels are inconsistent with the right of free
alienation, not one has promulgated a really convincing
reason for holding them inconsistent. It is not the intention of the writer herein to express his opinion as to the
propriety of the general rule and its exceptions but merely
to state as a conclusion that whatever may be its merits,
the general rule throughout the United States and England
is that equitable servitudes do not attach to chattels as they
do to land.
Herbert Horn

RIGHT TO RECLAIM DELIVERED GOODS IN A
CASH SALE
The term "cash sale" as applied to a sale of specific
goods has been used by the courts in two different senses.
It is sometimes used to denote a sale where title is not to
pass until the cash is paid and sometimes to denote a sale
where title has passed but possession is not to be delivered
until payment is made. When used in the latter sense, the
title passes at once upon the completion of the contract
by the force of it, so as to cast the risk upon the buyer and
entitle the seller to the price. However, the buyer, though
he has title, is not entitled to possession until he pays the
3861 N. E. 219, 179 Mass. 588, 55i L. R. A. 631 (1901).
89See 7 A. L. R. 443 and note.

6041 H. L. R. 945, at p. 982.
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price; for payment and delivery in such a case are presumed to be concurrent acts, and until payment is made the
seller may retain the goods by virtue of his vendor's lien.
But the seller retains the goods, and not the title. When
the term "cash sale" is used in the former sense on the
other hand, title will not pass until the price is paid or the
condition waived; for until the payment or its tender, the
seller retains not simply the possession, but the title also.'
The term in its technical sense 2 and as consistently used by
the courts of Pennsylvania3 signifies a sale where the
transfer of title is conditioned on payment and not a sale
where the transfer of possession or delivery of the goods is
conditioned on payment. An eminent writer on the subject 4 uses the term in a very narrow sense and states that
a sale is to be regarded as a cash sale, if the parties when
they make their bargain contemplate an exchange of the
goods for the price immediately on making the bargain. It
is fundamental that the reader understand that the term
"cash sale" as hereinafter referred to in this article signifies its technical meaning which is in accordance with the
construction zplaced on the term by the Pennsylvania
courts.
One of the rules often invoked for ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the time at which title passes
in a sale of specific goods is found in Rule 1 of Section 19
of the Uniform Sales Act. 5 It provides as follows: "Where
there is an unconditional contract to sell specific goods, in
a deliverable state, the property in the goods passes to the
buyer when the contract is made and it is immaterial
whether the time of payment, or the time of delivery, or
both, be postponed."
155 C. J. page 569; 11 C. J. page 24 (note) 57 (b).
2
Vold on Sales, page 168.
sPhiladelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. Lehigh Navigation Co., 36
Pa. 204 at 210 (1860); Hand v. Matthews, 208 Pa. 149 (1904); Ewing
v. Musser, 42 Pa. Super. Ct. 177 (1910); Robb v. Zern, 42 Pa. Super.
Ct. 182 (1910)1 Brown v. Reber, 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 114 (1906) and
Welsh v. Bell, 32 Pa. 12 (1858).
&Williston on Sales, Vol. II, page 549.
8
Act of May 19, 1915, P.L. 543.
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Apparently this section of the Act has effected a
change in the pre-existing law in Pennsylvania. Prior to
the enactment of the Sales Act in Pennsylvania the early
case of Welsh v. Bell6 and subsequent cases following that
deci-sion7 held that in the absence of a special provision or
understanding to the contrary, a cash sale is generally presumed to have been contemplated, so that if the contract is
silent as to the timne for payment a cash sale is implied. In
other words the cases prior to the act decided that payment in cash was always an implied condition to the
transfer of title when nothing was said concerning the time
or manner of making payment. Since the adoption of the
Sales Act in Pennsylvania the Supreme court of this state
in the case of Collins v. Oliver$expressly followed Rule 1 of
Section 19 of the act and stated the doctrine to be that
"when the terms of sale are agreed upon and the bargain
is struck and everything the seller has to do with the goods
is complete, the contract of sale becomes absolute as between the parties without actual payment or delivery, and
the property, and the risk of accident to the goods, vests
in the buyer." Again in the case of Perkins v. Halpren9 the
court stated the rule to be "that it is the contract to sell a
chattel, and not payment or delivery, which passes the
property." The effect of the Act and these decisions is to
change the pre-existing presumption in favor of a cash
sale when nothing is said concerning payment into the
presumption in favor of an absolute sale with a lien in the
seller. In arriving at this conclusion the writer has not
overlooked the lower court decision in the case of Wheeler
v. Payne'0 which, although decided since the Sales Act,
reiterates the rule as it existed prior to the Act. In any
event it is undoubtedly well settled both before and after
632 Pa. 12 (1858).
7Hand

v. Matthews, 208 Pa. 149 (1904); Brown v. Reber, 30 Pa.
Super. Ct. 114 (1906); Mervine v. Arndt, 33 Pa. Super. Ct. 333 (1907);
Ewing v. Musser, 4Z Pa. Super. Ct. 177 (1910); Robb v. Zern, 42 Pa.
Super. Ct. 182 (1910).
8299 Pa. 372 at page 376 (1930).
9257Pa. 402 at page 408 (1917).
101 D. & C. 155 (1921).
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the Sales Act that if the parties expressly provide for a
cash sale their manifest intention will be carried out by the
courts." It often becomes important to determine just
what effect delivery of possession of the goods to the buyer
has on the respective rights of the seller and buyer when
a cash sale is contemplated.
A leading and often cited 12 Pennsylvania case on this
subject is Frech v. Lewis.' 3 In this case the contract was
that the plaintiff should furnish the defendant with two
carriages to be paid for on delivery. The carriages were
delivered and the defendant promised either to see the
plaintiff or send him a check but failed to do either. While
the plaintiff was diligent and persistent in demanding payment, at no time did he demand a return of the carriages
or in any way assert his right to property in them until
after two months and a half had elapsed when he began
an action to replevy the goods.
The lower court in which the case arose submitted it
to the jury to determine whether the plaintiff by his conduct had waived his right to retake the carriages. The
jury found that he had not, and gave the plaintiff a verdict
for the carriages. On appeal to the Superior Court the
judgment of the lower court was affirmed." The Superior
Court held that it could not be said as a matter of law that
the plaintiff's conduct amounted to a waiver of his right,
but that his delay was only evidence of a waiver, and not
conclusive in view of the conduct of the defendant. On
appeal to the Supreme Court the judgment of the Superior
"XBlair v. Clark, 37 Pa. Super. Ct. 44 (1908); Woolsey v. Axton
and Son, 192 Pa. 526 (1899); Frech v. Lewis, 218 Pa. 141 (1907), and
Wheeler v. Payne, 1 D. & C. 155 (1921).
12
McCabe v. Northampton Trust Co., 60 Pa. Super. Ct. 20 (1915);
Sheritt and Stoer Co. v, Roberts Engineering Co., 73 Pa, Super. Ct.
151 (1919); Penn Lumber Co. v. Hanover Binding and Manufacturing Co., 96 Pa. Super. Ct. 20 (1929); First Nat. Bank of Litchfield v.
Pipe and Contractors' Supply Co., 273 Fed. 107 (1921); Dietrick v.
U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Co., 9 Fed. (2nd.) 742
(1925); People's State Bank of Michigan v. Brown, 103 Pac. 102
(1909); L. R. A. 1915 D 356; 23 L. R. A. (N.S.) 824.
2S218 Pa. 141 (1907).
1AFrech v. Lewis, 32 Pa. Super. Ct. 279 (1906).
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Court was reversed. Justice Stewart in a lengthy opinion,
in which he reviewed the Pennsylvania law, said concerning the holding of the Superior Court, "In this we cannot
concur. Reliance upon a subsequent promise to pay that
leads the seller to refrain from asserting his right to retake the property, is in itself a waiver of the right, and
makes absolute a delivery which in the first instance was
conditional."
The learned judge laid down the rule as follows: "The
settled doctrine of our cases is to the effect, that where
the contract of sale provides for payment of the purchase
price on delivery of the articles sold, and the seller delivers
the goods but the buyer fails to pay, the righe of property
does not pass to the buyer with the possession, but remains
with the seller, who may at his option reclaim the goods.
In some jurisdictions the right of property is held to pass
with the delivery, unless at the time the right to retake is
expressly declared by the seller. We have not gone so
far. Our cases proceed on the theory that until payment
has been made or waived, the contract remains executory,
and that delivery in such case is not a completion of the
contract, except as an intention to so regard it is expressly
declared or can fairly be inferred from the circumstances
attending. Possession, however, having passed, and the
buyer by the act of the seller having been invested with
the indicia of ownership, the policy of our law requires that
this situation-the possession in one and the right of
property in another-shall continue no longer than is
necessary to enable the seller to recover the goods with
which he has parted. The law gives the seller the right in
such case to reclaim his goods, but he must do so promptly,
otherwise he will be held to have waived his right, and can
only thereafter look to the buyer for the price."
The court then considered the question when an inference of waiver will arise. It pointed out that except
when delayed by trick or artifice, the assertion of the right
to reclaim the property must follow immediately upon
default. This the court said does not mean that the seller
must at that instant begin legal proceedings to recover the
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goods; but does mean that the seller when he discovers
that his delivery is not followed by payment as he had the
right to expect is at once put to his election whether he
will waive the condition as to payment and allow the delivery to become absolute, or retake the property, and that
he must not allow unnecessary delay in making his choice.
An eminent writer 5 on the subject has taken a different view of the matter. He states that the rule should be:
"If after bargaining for a cash, sale the seller subsequently
voluntarily delivers to the buyer the goods with the intent
that the buyer may immediately use them as his own and
without insisting upon contemporaneous payment, this
action is absolutely inconsistent with the original bargain.
Such a delivery is not only evidence of the waiver of the
condition of cash payment; it should be conclusive evidence."
The Supreme Court of Kansas pointed out the impracticability of such a doctrine in the case of Peoples State
Bank of Michigan Valley v. Brown6 where it is stated that
"as a practical necessity to avoid the inconvenience of requiring the seller of an article to keep one hand upon it
until with the other he grasps the currency tendered in
payment, there must be some relaxation of this rule. Delivery and payment, as a practical matter, cannot be absolutely simultaneous. Some slight interval between the
two acts is inevitable and the criterion upon which the
courts have agreed with substantial unanimity is that such
interval does not conclusively prove a total abandonment
of title and the right of possession by the seller, unless
under all the circumstances of the case it in fact shows
that result to have been intended."
In conclusion it may be said that if the seller delivers
possession of the subject matter at the time and place
specified without any intention, express or implied, of
waiving his right to payment in cash he may ordinarily,
on the refusal of the buyer to make payment, retake
possession for the reason that the delivery .is conditional
"3Williston on Sales, Section 346.
16103 Pac. 102 (1909); 23 L. R. A. (N:.)

824.
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on the payment of the price by the buyer. It has been held
that the seller may even justify the retaking of the goods
by force. 17 However the seller must be careful not to
waive his right to retake possession after delivery. Upon
the buyer's default he must make his election, either to
reclaim the goods or to look to the buyer for the price,
and if he elects the former remedy he must act promptly
in exercising it. In other words the seller cannot play fast
and loose; he cannot accept the buyer's promise to pay at a
future time and then later change his mind and attempt to
retake the goods.
It is submitted at this point that a case like Frech v.
Lewis arising now would not be construed as a cash sale in
view of the adoption by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania of Rule 1 of Section 19 of the Sales Act. In that
case the contract of sale provided for payment of the purchase price on delivery of the articles sold and the court
construed the transaction to be a cash sale in which payment is an implied condition to the transfer of title. Since
the contract said nothing concerning the time at which title
should pass the court applied the pre-existing presumption
that transfer of title and payment were concurrent conditions. By virtue of the adoption of Rule 1 of Section 19 of
the Sales Act in Pennsylvania such a case would be construed differently. Title to the goods would pass at once
upon the completion of the contract though no money be
paid nor goods delivered. It is submitted that the only instance in which the courts will construe a sale to be a cash
sale under the existing law in Pennsylvania today is where
the parties expressly stipulate in their bargain that payment in cash shall be a condition to the transfer of title.
But what is the seller's right of reclamation as against
purchasers of or creditors levying on the goods sold for
cash but delivered without payment? Considering first
the respective rights of the original seller and a subsequent
bona fide purchaser from the original buyer it may be
"7 Leedom v. Phillips, I Yeates 527 (1795). See also 55 C. J. 567;
Henderson v. Lauch, 21 Pa. 359 (1853); Refining and Storage Co. v.
Miller, 7 Phila. 97 (1868); Windle v, Moore, 1 Chest. Co. 409 (1879),
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said that there is much confusion among the courts of the
different jurisdictions. 8 One line of authorities holds that,
the buyer having no title, a subsequent purchaser from him
can obtain no better title, and will not be protected in his
purchase as agains't the true owner.' Another line of cases
holds that, the seller having visited the buyer with the
indicia of ownership, and thereby enabled him to dispose
of the property to a third person, as between the two, the
seller should suffer the loss occasioned by the fraud of the
buyer.20
A leading writer2 takes the position that
although the parties originally contemplated a cash sale,
delivery and permission to the buyer to use and enjoy the
goods as his own are inconsistent with the original bargain
so that a conditional sale is substituted and the transaction
should be dealt with according to the rules governing conditional sales which protect innocent purchasers and subsequent creditors of the original buyer in the absence of
recordation.
The early Pennsylvania case of Leedom v. Phillips2
held that the subsequent purchaser for value was protected. In that case the plaintiffs contracted to. sell one
Edwards sugar for cash. The sugar was delivered on the
pavement in front of Edwards' store and was sold by
Edwards to the defendant, who subsequently removed it to
his store. Plaintiffs sought to replevy the sugar from the
defendant. The court held, "that if one sells goods for
cash and the buyer takes them away without payment of
the money, the seller should immediately reclaim them by
pursuing the party, and he may justify the retaking of
SSee

13 L. R. A. (N.S.) 697; 29 L.R. A. (N,S.) 709; 47 L. R. A,

(N.S.) 173; 23 R. C. L. 1385, Sec. 208 and 209.
19
Coggill v. Hartford & N. H. R. Co., 3 Gray (Mass.) 545; Hirschorn v. Canney, 98 Mass. 149; Hart v. Boston & M. R. Co., 72 N. H.
410; National Bank v. Chicago B. & N. R. Co., 44 Minn. 224; Harmon v. Goetter, 87 Ala. 325.
20
Michigan C. R. Co. v. Phillips, 60 Ill.
190; Ohio & M. R. Co,
v, Kerr, 49 ill. 458; Lee v. Galbraith, 5 La. Ann 343 and Hammett v.
Linneman, 48 N. Y. 399.
1
'Williston on Sales, Section 346.
221 Yeates 527 (1795).
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them by force****. If the sale of the sugar to the defendant was bona fide, it ought to prevail. The plaintiffs should
suffer by their own remissness, and not an innocent purchaser." This doctrine was iterated in the case of Werley
v. Dunn28 which held that, "where on a sale of goods the
price is to be paid partly by notes and partly in cash, and
the seller delivers the goods, accepts a notd and a check,
and the check is not paid because there are no funds in
bank, title to the goods does not pass. If in such a case the
seller agrees to permit the purchaser to retain the goods
upon the execution by the latter of a chattel lease, the purchaser cannot thereafter make a good title to the goods
even to an innocent purchaser for value." It is submitted
that this rule is in accordance with the adverse position the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has often taken toward
the separation of title and possession, and also in substantial conformity with its frequent holding that "where an
owner of personal property has so acted with reference to
his property as to invest another with such evidence of
ownership, or apparent authority to deal with and dispose
of it, as is calculated to mislead a good faith purchaser for
value, an estoppel will arise against him. ' 24 Subsequent
creditors, being in the same position as innocent purchasers
for value, should equally be protected under the same rule.
As to prior creditors of the cash sale buyer it is quite
uniformly held that since such creditors are not in the position of bona fide purchasers, if the debtor is the buyer in
a contract for the sale of goods to be paid for in cash, and
the goods are conditionally delivered to him, and are levied
upon while in his hands and before payment, the right of
the seller to reclamation is superior to the right of the
buyer's creditor. 25 Although there appears to be no express
2856 Pa. Super. Ct. 254 (1914).
24O'Connor v. Clark, 170 Pa. 318 (1895); Leitch v. Sanford Motor Truck Co., 279 Pa. 164 (1924); Commercial Motors Mortgage Co.

v. Water, 280 Pa. 177 (1924); McLaughlin's Assigned Estate, 280 Pa.
597 (1924) and Truck Tractor and Forwarding Co. v. Baker, 281 Pa.
145 (1924).
25See
13 L. R. A. (N.S.) 697; 29 L. R. A, (N.S.) 709; 47 L. R, A,
(NZ.) 173; 23 R. C. L., p. 1384, Section 207.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

285,

holding in Pennsylvania on this point, it is submitted that
our courts will apply the general rule as to prior creditors
in accordance with the view taken by the majority of
states.
Edgar K. Markley.

IS PA. SWINGING TO THE FEDERAL RULE ON
CORPORATE ULTRA VIRES CONTRACTS?
"Contracts ultra vires of the corporation making them
are not merely voidable but wholly void and of no effect
and no performance by either party can give the unlawful
contract any validity." This startling statement was recently made by the Pennsylvania Superior Court, in a
decision involving Pennsylvania law, and dealing with a
Pennsylvania corporation.'
Bedell, the plaintiff, was an employee of the Oliver H.
Bair Co. funeral directors, the defendants. While so employed, the plaintiff executed a "Benefit Bond" wherein it
was agreed between the plaintiff and defendant that in
consideration of the payment of forty-six cents ($.46)
quarterly during the term of the plaintiff's life, the defendant Co. would "care for and inter the remains" of the plaintiff at a total cost of $75. Failure to pay for three months
worked a forfeiture of the agreement. Plaintiff in pursuance thereof paid the quarterly sums for twenty-eight
years, in the aggregate amount of $51.74. Being advised
that the contract was illegal, the plaintiff demanded from
the defendant the amount paid in and upon defendant's
refusal to refund the amount, sued in assumpsit. The
Superior Court, through Judge Cunningham, affirmed the
opinion of Judge Finletter in the court below finding that
the contract was one of insurance, was clearly ultra vires
of the defendant corporation, was therefore utterly void and
of no effect, and no action could be based upon it! However, as suit was brought in assumpsit the court allowed a
quasi-contractual recovery by the plaintiff.
'Bedell v. Oliver H. Bir Co. Inc., 158 Atl. 651.

